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We argue that extreme positioning benefits parties in new democracies, because—given the lack of other reliable
cues such as party histories—the distinctiveness of their left-right policy positions increases voter certainty about
parties’ identities and intentions in office. Cross-sectional analyses provide evidence that, in the new democracies of
postcommunist Europe, parties that are farther away from the mean voter position gain more popular support than
those moderately positioned along a policy continuum. In established democracies, by contrast, policy moderation
increases popular support. We also find empirical support for the proposed causal mechanism that links policy
positions to popular support via voter certainty. These findings have implications for party strategies, spatial
theories, and our understanding of political representation in new democracies.
E
xisting cross-national research suggests that
parties gain votes by adopting positions close
to the mean (or median) voter’s position
(Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000a; Alvarez, Nagler,
and Willette 2000b; Dow 2001, 2011; Schofield 2004;
see also Schofield, Sened, and Nixon 1998a; Schofield
et al. 1998b).1 In this article, we argue that this rela-
tionship is less likely to hold in new democracies,
where parties are, instead, more likely to be rewarded
for extremism than centrism. Our argument, which
we detail in the next section, builds on three central
premises derived from the existing literature. First,
parties with less ambiguous positions (i.e., positions
about which voters, on average, are more certain)
attract more electoral support. Second, centrist posi-
tions generate more ambiguity and voter uncertainty
than noncentrist positions. Third, noncentrist or
extremist positions are particularly effective in re-
ducing voter uncertainty when other cues about party
identities and intentions are absent, as is the case in
new democracies.
In order to test our argument, we conduct a
macrolevel analysis of party positioning and election
outcomes across 31 countries from 1996 to 2007.2
Our study produces the following findings. First, with
respect to the established democracies, we corrobo-
rate the findings of the existing studies of multiparty
competition that parties receive a statistically signif-
icant electoral benefit from locating near the mean
voter position. Second, in line with our theoretical
expectation, we find that in the context of new,
postcommunist democracies, parties receive an
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2This macrolevel approach has been used extensively in empirical studies of the electoral effects of candidates’ and parties’ positioning in
the United States (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson, MacKue, and
Stimson 2002), the United Kingdom (Nagel and Wlezien 2010), and across 12 West European democracies (Ezrow 2005, 2010), as well
as in studies of the electoral effects of economic conditions both inside and outside of the United States (Lewis-Beck 1988; Powell 2000;
Powell and Whitten 1993). Ours is the first study to extend this approach to the analysis of party competition in new, postcommunist
democracies.
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electoral benefit when they adopt distinctly non-
centrist (i.e., extremist) policy positions. Third, we
also find support for our causal mechanism by
showing that (1) voters in both types of democracies
prefer not to support parties whose positions are
uncertain, and (2) in postcommunist countries, voters
are more certain of the ideological stances of extreme
than moderate parties. By contrast, this relationship
between party position and voter certainty is much
weaker in established democracies where well-known
party profiles already exist for moderate parties.
Our findings highlight the importance of voter
certainty about party positions in explaining electoral
outcomes. They further suggest that the spatial
modeling framework helps us understand electoral
competition not only in advanced but also in newer
democracies (see also Rohrschneider and Whitefield
2009). More specifically, our results have important
implications for party strategies in relatively new
democracies (Budge 1994; Laver 2005; see also Budge,
Ezrow, and McDonald 2010). In these democracies—
characterized by unstable party systems (Birch 2003;
Powell and Tucker 2013; Rose and Mishler 2010; van
Biezen 2003; Tavits 2005), uncertainty about how
election outcomes are translated into governing coa-
litions (Druckman and Roberts 2007; Grzymala-Busse
2001; Tzelgov 2011), and uncertainty about how
governing coalitions formulate policy—citizens reward
parties that present extreme party positions, because
these parties are more successful at communicating
clear policy stances than moderate parties. Given this,
parties that want to maximize vote share are better off
by adopting distinctly noncentrist policy positions in
these systems.
Party Positions and Voter Support:
Theoretical Expectations
Existing literature on the electoral consequences of
party positioning has mostly focused on advanced
democracies. In this context, macrolevel research look-
ing at parties’ vote shares in real-world multiparty
elections concludes that parties typically gain votes
when they are positioned closer to the center of the
voter distribution (Ezrow 2005).3 Most simulation-
based empirical studies using individual-level survey
data from real-world multiparty elections agree that
centrist party positioning would increase popular
support (Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000a; Alvarez,
Nagler, and Willette 2000b; Schofield, Sened, and
Nixon 1998a; Schofield et al. 1998b). These findings
are in line with the traditional spatial model of two-
party electoral competition that predicts convergent
party behavior (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich
1984) and with the theoretical models that assume
probabilistic voting according to which parties maxi-
mize their vote shares by moderating their ideological
policy programs in multiparty systems (e.g., Lin,
Enelow, and Dorussen 1999).4
In this article, we argue that a similar relationship
between policy moderation and vote maximization is
less likely to exist in new democracies. Rather, we
argue that, all other things equal, in these countries
it is the distinctly noncentrist party positions that
attract more support. This expectation is based on
three specific arguments, each of which we will elab-
orate on below. First, the higher the voter uncertainty
about a party’s position, the less electoral support is
it able to attract. Second, the more centrist the policy
position of a party, the more difficult it is for voters to
discern what the party actually stands for. Conversely,
the more distinct (noncentrist) a party position, the
clearer its message and the easier it is for voters to
identify its position. Third, extreme party positioning
on a left-right scale is an especially potent signal that
helps to decrease ambiguity and voter uncertainty
about party positioning. It is likely to be most power-
ful in low-information environments present in new
democracies due to the lack of long-established party
reputations that otherwise would provide cues to
voters about parties’ general policy profiles.
Uncertainty Repels Voters
The argument that voter support is lower for the
parties whose positions are uncertain builds directly
on the literature on information and elections (Alvarez
1998; Bartels 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Franklin
1991; Hinich and Munger 1997; Koch 2003; Page 1976,
1978). Specifically, Alvarez argues that ‘‘with high
uncertainty the voter has a difficult time discerning
3Niche parties, i.e., parties belonging to the Green, Communist,
and the extreme-right Nationalist party families, are the excep-
tion (see Ezrow 2010).
4This position, however, is somewhat contested. For example, the
formal theoretical models that assume deterministic voting pre-
dict noncentrist party behavior (Cox 1990; see also Adams 2001),
and some simulation-based studies conclude that parties would
maximize votes by presenting distinctly noncentrist positions
(Adams and Merrill 1999, 2000). Still other studies highlight the
relevance of valence characteristics in determining whether
centrist or noncentrist positioning is going to be more electorally
beneficial (Schofield 2004; Schofield and Sened 2006).
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where in the issue space the candidate’s position may
be’’ (1998, 31). He introduces this uncertainty into the
standard spatial model and demonstrates that ‘‘under
the assumption that voters are risk-averse (implied by
the assumption that voter utility functions are single-
peaked and concave), perceptual uncertainty depresses
the voter’s utility for a candidate’’ (33). Using simulated
data, Alvarez further finds that the influence of voter
uncertainty on candidate evaluation is substantial
(‘‘especially when the candidate is very close to the
voter on the issue’’) and concludes with the following
hypothesis: ‘‘The greater the individual’s uncertainty
about the candidate’s policy positions, the lower their
utility for the candidate and hence the lower their
probability of supporting the candidate, all other things
held constant’’ (36). In general, these studies portray
voters as risk averse, reluctant to support a candidate or
party whose position is uncertain because, depending
on the level of uncertainty, the party may actually be
quite far from the position that the voter prefers
(Koch 2003).
In addition to reluctance, voters may simply not
be able to vote for a party based on their policy pref-
erences if they do not know where the party stands
(Page 1976, 1978). Alvarez (1998, 36–41) provides a
formalization of this proposition as well. Additionally,
looking at the level of party systems, Dalton (2008)
and Lachat (2008), for example, demonstrate that the
extent of ideological voting increases as parties take
more divergent positions. If parties are hard to dis-
tinguish based on their policy positions, vote choice
becomes influenced by other, nonpolicy related (and
perhaps random) factors (see also Alvarez 1998).
Finally, uncertainty may also undermine the
nonpolicy-related evaluations, i.e., the credibility
and competitiveness of a party, by making it look
‘‘evasive or spineless’’ (Campbell 1983, 278).5 Media
and rival parties can easily reinforce this perception
by depicting the party as opportunistic, equivocal, or
flip-flopping. All this erodes the valence evaluations
of the party and thereby hurts its electoral performance
as elegantly shown, both formally and empirically, by
Schofield and Sened (2006). Clark (2009) also shows
that the effect of valence evaluations on vote choice is
comparable to that of policy evaluations.
In sum, voters are less likely to vote for a party
whose position is uncertain because it is risky (or
even impossible) to cast a policy-based vote for such
a party and/or because the party has low valence.
Related to these arguments, Hinich and Munger
(1997) move the analysis to the party level and show
that in the spatial model, uncertainty can cause an
extremist to win over a centrist party. This is espe-
cially likely if the level of uncertainty (understood as
variance around the mean placement guess by voters)
about the extremist’s position is lower than that of
the centrist’s position. This brings us to the second
part of our argument.
Centrist Positions Generate Uncertainty
We argue that voters are more likely to be certain
about the positions of noncentrist than centrist parties
because these positions send clearer and stronger
signals about party stances. Hinich and Munger, for
example, argue that voters have clearer expectations of
what extremists—as opposed to centrists—will actu-
ally do while in office. They state that ‘‘the cognitive
process by which voters form expectations about what
candidates will likely do in office . . . advantages ex-
tremists’’ (1997, 126). It is simply harder for a centrist
party to offer a similar level of commitment and clarity
(see also Hinich and Munger 1994). ‘‘Political extrem-
ists may be more doctrinally pure and consistent, and
therefore have lower perceived variance, than candi-
dates in the middle’’ (127). Similarly, Rabinowitz and
Macdonald, when presenting their directional model
of voting, argue that noncentrist positions represent
‘‘clear, strong stands’’ (1989, 98), are of high intensity
and evoke clear (emotional) responses from voters.
Centrist positions, on the other hand, can easily appear
ambiguous and of low intensity.6
These arguments are in accord with the expecta-
tion that voters lack the resources to gather detailed
information about party positions, and, therefore,
look for simple but fundamental underlying principles
that guide party stances (Kitschelt 2000). A noncentrist
position is likely to provide a clear signal about such
principles. Consider, for example, two parties, A and
B. Party A adopts some rightist and some leftist5Not all authors agree that uncertainty about party positions
repels voters. For example, Tomz and van Houweling (2009),
using survey data from the United States, argue the exact
opposite. There are also formal studies on strategic ambiguity
suggesting that candidates benefit from adopting vague issue
positions (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Alesina and Holden
2008). These studies, however, are explicitly designed to address
the specific context of two-party systems with primaries rather
than multiparty competition more broadly.
6According to Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989), candidates and
parties that want voters to be well-informed of their positions
and base judgments about them on these positions will take
noncentrist positions. Those that want to remain noncommittal
on an issue, and prevent voters from using their position on that
issue as the basis for judging the party, will take centrist positions.
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positions on specific issues to arrive at an overall
centrist platform. Party B, in contrast, takes consistent
and high-intensity right-wing positions on all issues.
It is easy to see how voters might be more confused
about the position of party A than party B given the
explicit conservatism that underlies the platform of the
latter as opposed to the absence of any clear ideological
principle underlying the platform of the former.
It is important to note that centrist positions are
not just likely to be more ambiguous but they also
appear more confusing to voters. This is relevant in
so far as uncertainty can result not only from the
ambiguity of party positions, but also from the failure
of voters to receive or correctly interpret information
about an otherwise unambiguous position.
Extremism Reduces Uncertainty
in New Democracies
Finally, we argue that noncentrist position taking is
an especially informative signal in new democracies.
In particular, our empirical focus will be on the democ-
racies of postcommunist Europe. In new democracies,
we argue, the overall level of voter certainty about party
positioning is likely to be considerably lower than in
advanced democracies because any cues generated by
party histories and interactions are absent. Therefore,
taking an extreme ideological position can be an
especially potent remedy for reducing voter uncertainty
about what a given party stands for.
This expectation, again, draws on insights from
the literature on information and elections, according
to which voters are more likely to be certain about
party positions when they are afforded a greater oppor-
tunity to learn about parties’ ideological orientations
(Alvarez 1998; Bartels 1986). Similarly, Koch (2003)
argues, citing psychological research, that citizens’
certainty judgments may be influenced not only by
higher levels of factual information but also by their
general familiarity with the party. In accord with this
argument, studies show that voters are generally more
certain about the placement of incumbents than chal-
lengers. Some scholars even argue that the phenomenon
of incumbency advantage can, at least partially, be
explained by greater voter certainty about incumbents’
as opposed to challengers’ positions (Bernhardt and
Ingberman 1985; Ingberman 1989). Because of the
advantage that incumbents enjoy in terms of voter in-
formation levels and familiarity, they do not necessarily
need to take clear ideological positions to decrease
voters’ sense of uncertainty. Challengers, or parties that
are not well known and whose positions have received
little exposure, on the other hand, are likely to take
more extreme issue positions (Groseclose 2001),
possibly in an attempt to reduce voter uncertainty
and thereby compensate for this disadvantage
(Koch 2003).
We can translate these arguments into expect-
ations about differences between advanced and new
democracies. Voters in old democracies have had
a greater opportunity to learn about parties’ ideolog-
ical orientations and are also likely to be generally
more familiar with the parties in their system than are
voters in new democracies. In the latter case, party
systems are young and unstable (Tavits 2005), party
organizations are still developing, and direct contacts
between voters and parties are limited (Mair and van
Biezen 2001; Tavits 2013; van Biezen 2003), and
voters have had little opportunity to learn about
party ideologies, the democratic process (Mainwaring
and Scully 1995; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986;
Tavits and Annus 2006), or even the meaning of the
left-right ideological scale. This uncertainty generated
by the absence of party histories and voter experience
with the democratic process is further exacerbated by
party behavior in the region. For example, Tavits and
Letki (2009) report how programmatically center-left
parties often implement rightist (and center-right
parties leftist) policies once in office. Governing coali-
tions, too, are frequently odd compromises between
leftist and rightist parties (Druckman and Roberts
2007; Grzymala-Busse 2001). When in advanced de-
mocracies consistent behavior by parties may help
clarify their positions,7 party behavior in the nonelec-
toral arena—possibly motivated by alternative strategic
considerations (Druckman and Roberts 2007;
Grzymala-Busse 2001; Tavits and Letki 2009; Tzelgov
2011)—does not allow for such a possibility. For these
reasons, several authors have pointed out that voters in
new democracies are more likely to be confused about
the ideological differences between parties than voters
in advanced democracies (Grzymala-Busse 2006;
Rose 1995) and that voter attachments to parties are
weaker (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Ezrow, Tavits,
and Homola, n.d.).
Given the low-information environment, we argue
that centrist positions and fine gradations in party
ideologies are likely to be especially confusing and
uninformative for voters. In such an environment,
where they are unable to rely on contextual cues and
experience, voters need other credible and strong
signals about party positions. Just as was the case with
7See especially Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) about the role of
coalition participation on the level of voter information about
party positions.
538 lawrence ezrow, jonathan homola, and margit travits
informationally disadvantaged challengers discussed
above, taking noncentrist positions is likely to provide
one such signal. Indeed, because ideological competi-
tion and party systems are still developing, scholars
have argued that symbolic politics evoking emotions
and sentiments is likely to be especially relevant in new
democracies (Evans 2006).8 More extreme ideological
positions are more likely to reach voters because they
evoke such emotions (Rabinowitz and Macdonald
1989). Reaching voters, in turn, is likely to decrease
their uncertainty about party positions.
Taken together, we have argued that (1) voter
support is lower for parties whose positions are
uncertain, and (2) a noncentrist position increases
voter certainty especially in new democracies. If these
arguments hold, then it follows that, in these new
democracies, noncentrist policy positions are elec-
torally more beneficial than centrist ones.9 As a
corollary, parties with extreme positions are likely to
attract more votes the higher the general level of
voter uncertainty about party positions. In sum,
previous literature on the electoral consequences of
party positioning in established democracies and
our own theorizing about this relationship in new
(postcommunist) democracies allows formulating
the following two hypotheses:
H1 (The Established Parties Hypothesis): In established
democracies, the closer the party is to the mean voter
position on the left-right scale, the higher its vote share.
H2 (The Postcommunist Parties Hypothesis): In post-
communist democracies, the closer the party is to the
mean voter position on the left-right scale, the lower its
vote share.
In addition to these main hypotheses, we will also test
two other steps in the proposed causal chain: (1) that
voters are, in general (i.e., in all types of democracies),
reluctant to vote for parties whose positions are
unclear, and (2) voters in new (postcommunist)
democracies are more likely to be certain about the
positions of noncentrist than centrist parties.
Data, Measures, and Method
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we employ
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES),
which allow us to construct measures of the mean
citizen policy preference in each country, as well as
measures of the policy distances between the parties’
positions (as perceived by the citizens) and the mean
citizen preference. The measure of our dependent
variable—popular support (vote share)—controls for
the possibility that successful parties will receive
fewer votes in systems where there are more com-
petitive parties. Specifically, we use the Normalized
Vote Share calculated as follows:
Normalized vote share ðNVSÞ ¼ Vij  Nj; ð1Þ
where Vij equals the absolute share of the vote for
party i in election j (as reported by the CSES), and Nj
is the number of parties in election j receiving over
5% of the vote.10
The measure of party policy distance also relies on
observations from the CSES. The survey asks respond-
ents in each country to place themselves, and each of
their significant national parties, on a left-right scale that
ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).11
The mean voter position in each country election year
is computed as the mean response to this item. Party
left-right policy positions are calculated as the mean
response to a similar item about the left-right position
of the national parties competing in an election year.12
The party’s distance to the mean voter position is
measured as the difference between party position and
the mean citizen placement:
8Although primarily focusing on uncovering the structure of
party competition in new democracies at the voter level, much of
the argumentation in Evans and Whitefield (1993) also implies
the importance of clarity of positioning and signaling under
conditions of uncertainty in postcommunist countries (see also
Evans and Whitefield 2000).
9Note that the directional theory of voting (Rabinowitz and
Macdonald 1989) reaches a similar conclusion by assuming that
voters prefer parties that take high-intensity positions on ‘‘their’’
side of the ideological scale. Their theory does not provide an
explicit explanation for such a voting preference. Here, we
provide a specific and testable causal mechanism by arguing that
voters are likely to prefer the noncentrist parties to the centrist
ones because they are more likely to be certain about what the
former as opposed to the latter stand for, and it is risky or even
impossible for voters to cast a (policy based) vote for a party
whose position they cannot determine.
10Note that we also conducted additional statistical analyses
employing the parties’ absolute vote shares and, to address
concerns about the bounded nature of vote shares, logged vote
shares as dependent variables. These analyses (presented in Tables
S2a–S4c of the supplementary appendix) supported the sub-
stantive conclusions reported below.
11Question wording: ‘‘In politics people sometimes talk of left
and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’’
12Specifically, respondents were asked the following question: ‘‘In
politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you
place [PARTY] on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and
10 means the right?’’ The mean value of all responses to this item
in a given election survey constitutes the overall left-right policy
stance of the party.
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Party policy distance ¼ Ai  Xij j; ð2Þ
where Ai is the position of the mean voter on the left-
right dimension, and Xi is the mean perceived position
of party X.13
In order to test the two hypotheses, we first estimate
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for
advanced and new democracies separately. The specifi-
cation of these models is as follows:
Normalized vote share ¼ b1þ b2 Party policy distance½ 
þ e;
ð3Þ
H1: b2 , 0, for parties in established democracies,
H2: b2 . 0, for parties in postcommunist democracies,
where Party policy distance equals the left-right
distance between the party’s position and the mean
voter position.
In alternative analyses, we replace the party policy
distance by relative party policy distance in order to
account for variation in the dispersion of parties
along the left-right scale across different countries.
This measure normalizes a party’s policy distance from
the mean voter position to the average policy distance
of all of the parties competing in the same election.14
It is calculated by dividing a party’s policy distance by
the average party policy distance of the given election:
Relative party policy distance ¼ Aj  Xij
 
+i Aj  Xij
 n
: ð4Þ
Our analysis encompasses 335 observations of party
policy distances and vote shares in 31 democracies,
including 90 observations from the 10 postcommunist
democracies for which CSES data are available:
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Slovenia.
The supplementary appendix presents the complete
set of countries, election years, political parties, mean
voter positions, parties’ left-right positions, and party
vote shares included in the empirical analyses. Table 1
reports the means and standard deviations of the
observed values of the variables in our data set.
Our cross-sectional analysis pools 194 parties; each
observed an average of 1.7 elections. For postcom-
munist countries, there are 67 parties; each observed
an average of 1.3 elections. While most parties are
observed only once in the analysis, the error terms for
the parties competing in each election are unlikely to
be independent. Namely, if a party manages to receive
a greater than expected vote share in an election,
other parties in the same election will have lower than
expected vote shares. Thus the errors for all parties in
the same election will be correlated. We address this
concern through the estimation of heteroskedastic
robust standard errors clustered by election. If we
estimate robust standard errors clustered on party or
country, our substantive results remain unchanged
for all of the analyses reported below. Additionally,
the results remain unchanged if we control for
country-specific effects.15
Results
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for
Equation (3), which estimates popular support for
the parties that are included in the empirical analysis,
stratified by type of democracy (established and
postcommunist). The parameter estimates in Table 2
support the Established Parties Hypothesis. In Columns
1–2 of Table 2, the coefficients for party policy distance
are negative and statistically significant indicating
that as a party’s policy distance increases, its vote
share decreases. Thus, moderate party positioning
and popular support appear to be linked across
established democracies in our analysis.
The results from Columns 3–4 in Table 2 also
confirm the Postcommunist Parties Hypothesis.
Each of the parameter estimates for party policy
distance is positive and reaches statistical significance.
These estimates indicate that in postcommunist coun-
tries, those parties that are perceived to be farther away
from the center of the voter distribution are likely to
receive more votes than their centrist counterparts.
13Several studies suggest that the patterns of ideological struc-
turing underlying the left-right scale may differ between Eastern
and Western Europe (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1993) as well as
across countries and time (Evans and Whitefield 1998; Harbers,
de Vries, and Steenbergen 2013; Linzer 2008). We address this
issue in the supplementary appendix (p. S1) and conclude that
(1) the general understanding of left-right is similar across CEE
and WE (see also Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012) and (2)
our results are not likely to be affected by any cross-national
differences in the meaning of left-right.
14Party policy distance can also be measured relative to the
dispersion of the voter distribution (i.e., the standard deviation of
respondents’ left-right self-placements in the country) in order to
account for whether parties compete in compact or dispersed
electorates (see Alvarez and Nagler 2004). Using this measure
does not change the results.
15These analyses are available in Tables S2e–S4g of the supple-
mentary appendix.
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The central implication of this result is that it is the
ideological distinctiveness along the left-right dimen-
sion that contributes to the electoral success of parties
in postcommunist systems.
There are three additional notable features about
the effects that we report in Columns 1 and 3 and in
Columns 2 and 4. First, although the coefficients are
signed in the opposite direction, they are nearly iden-
tical in magnitude (210.12 and 10.01; 218.10 and
20.17). Second, the differences between the coefficients
estimated for established democracies and postcom-
munist democracies are statistically significant.16 Third,
the effects are substantively large. A party competing in
a postcommunist system with three competitive parties
that is three units away from the mean voter position
will gain, on average, 6.66 percentage points more than
a centrist party which is only one unit from the mean
voter position. In a four-party system, the more extreme
party under this scenario gains on average five percent-
age points more than the centrist competitor.17
To further illustrate the central conclusion from
the above analyses, consider Figure 1 that plots the
policy distances of parties along the x-axis and their
absolute vote percentages along the y-axis (these are
not normalized vote percentages).18 The slope estimates
of the ‘‘best-fit’’ lines for the postcommunist democra-
cies are distinctly positive (B 5 2.54; p , 0.05), indi-
cating that parties in postcommunist democracies tend
to receive greater vote shares as their policy distance
(or distinctiveness) from the center of the voter distri-
bution increases. Alternatively, the negative slope-lines
for parties in advanced democracies (B 5 22.37;
p , 0.001) suggest that these parties benefit from
adopting policies closer to the center of the voter
distribution.
We have here focused on a single left-right policy
dimension. However, previous research (Kriesi et al.
2008; Marks et al. 2006) highlights the role of an addi-
tional noneconomic dimension of party competition in
at least some Western European countries. A unidi-
mensional analysis could thus potentially bias our
results. Benoit and Laver (2006) have identified the
following countries in our datasets as the ones where
political competition revolves primarily around a
single left-right dimension: Britain, the Netherlands,
Italy, Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. We estimated
separate models excluding these countries from the
sample of advanced democracies. The results (presented
in Table S2m of the supplementary appendix [see also
Table S3m]) hold for the multidimensional countries,
suggesting that we are not biasing our results by
omitting these additional dimensions.
Note that, because we do not present dynamic
analyses (i.e., we do not study the effect of change in
party positions), our results do not necessarily imply
that political parties will, over time, converge on the
mean voter position in established democracies and
rush to the extremes in postcommunist ones. Position
change may or may not be advantageous for the party
depending on, for example, the credibility of the change
(see Tavits 2007) or whether the change corresponds
with changing public opinion (see Ezrow 2005). Indeed,
previous research reports only very small and lagged
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent
and Independent Variables
All
Countries Postcommunist Advanced
Normalized vote
share
90.31
(54.16)
92.36
(59.20)
89.56
(52.30)
Party policy
distance
1.76
(1.06)
1.88
(1.23)
1.71
(.98)
Relative party
distance
1.00
(.56)
1.00
(.61)
1.00
(.54)
Proportion
willing to
place party
82.30
(11.52)
75.82
(13.95)
84.68
(9.46)
Standard
deviation of
placements
2.11
(.49)
2.34
(.46)
2.03
(.47)
Note: Table entries are mean values with respective standard
deviations in parentheses. The variables are defined in Equations
(1), (2), and (4) in the text. The complete set of countries, election
years, political parties, mean voter positions, parties’ left-right
positions, and party vote shares included in the empirical analyses
are presented in the online supplementary information.
16The parameter estimates of an interaction model specification
were estimated to confirm this finding.
17In alternative analyses, reported in the supplementary appendix
(Tables S5h–S4l, pp. S17–S21), we also control for the effect of
incumbency and the economy and find similar results regardless
of whether incumbents are defined as members of the governing
coalition at the time of the election or as communist successor
parties. Additionally, controlling for membership size or the
extensiveness of parties’ presence in local communities (Tavits
2013) did not alter the results for the postcommunist sample.
18To ensure that the substantive conclusions are not affected by
our measure of the dependent variable, we estimated additional
models using party’s absolute vote share as the dependent variable.
For these analyses, it remains necessary to control for the number
of competitors. We used two measures of ‘‘effective number of
parties’’ based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979): one based on
party vote shares, and one based on seat shares. We also used
a measure based on the number of parties receiving over 5% of the
vote. Our results remain unchanged regardless of the measure used
(see Tables S2a–S4b of the supplementary appendix).
when extremism pays 541
electoral benefits for parties that moderated their
positions in established democracies (Adams and
Somer-Topcu 2009). Furthermore, we performed an
alternative set of analyses using parties’ squared
proximities to the mean voter position as the mea-
sure of party policy distance in order to see whether
parties’ vote shares increase more rapidly in response to
increasingly moderate (extreme) positions in advanced
(postcommunist) democracies. The results suggested
this not to be the case.
Testing the Mechanism (I): Party Policy
Distance and Voter Certainty
According to our theory, the central finding (i.e., that, in
postcommunist countries, parties benefit from taking
more extreme policy positions) depends on the relation-
ship between party policy distance and voter certainty
about parties’ positions. Our argument suggests that this
relationship is different for new democracies compared
to the established ones. Specifically, we argued that, in
TABLE 2 The Effect of Party Policy Distance on Normalized Vote Share
Advanced Democracies Postcommunist Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party policy distance -10.12***
(3.13)
10.01*
(5.19)
Relative party policy distance -18.10***
(6.43)
20.17*
(11.06)
Constant 106.88***
(5.41)
107.66***
(6.39)
73.59***
(12.57)
72.20***
(12.66)
N 245 245 90 90
R2 .04 .03 .04 .04
Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on election) in parentheses.
The dependent variable is Normalized vote share, which is calculated as the party’s vote share multiplied by the number of
competitive parties in the election (see Equation 1 in the text). Relative party policy distance is described in Equation (4) in the text.
*p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
FIGURE 1 Party Policy Distance and Vote Share
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new democracies, extremism enhances voter certainty
about party position. Citizens in established democra-
cies, on the other hand, are likely to be relatively more
certain about policy position of all, including the
moderate parties.
We can provide a direct test of this expectation.
To measure voter certainty about party positions, we
rely on the CSES question (also described in the pre-
vious section) that asks respondents in each country
to place each of their significant national parties on
a left-right scale that ranges from 0 (extreme left) to
10 (extreme right). We construct two alternative and
relatively straightforward measures of voter certainty.
First, we calculate the proportion of respondents that
were willing to place the party on the left-right scale
(variable labeled proportion willing to place the party).
Second, we calculate the standard deviation of
respondents’ left-right placements of the party’s
position (variable labeled standard deviation of citizen
placements).19
We use OLS with robust standard errors clustered
on party to estimate the effect of party policy distance
on voter certainty about policy position. The results
presented in Table 3 support our expectation that
party policy distance is more closely associated with
voter certainty in the postcommunist countries than in
established democracies. In Column 1 of Table 3, the
coefficient for party policy distance is positive and sta-
tistically significant for the postcommunist observa-
tions, indicating that as party policy distance increases,
the proportion of respondents that are willing to
place the party on the left-right scale also increases.
Similarly, the coefficient in Column 2, which estimates
the effect of party policy distance on the standard
deviation of citizen placements, is negative and statisti-
cally significant, which indicates that as party policy
distance increases, citizens are, on average, more
consistent in their placement of that party. In sum,
in the postcommunist context, extreme party position-
ing appears to be associated with increased voter
certainty about the party’s left-right position.
The results for the established democracies are
weak and mixed. In Column 3, the coefficient for
the party policy distance is positive and statistically
significant suggesting that as party policy distance
increases, more people are willing to place the party
on the left-right scale. However, the coefficient (1.27)
is more than three times smaller than was the case
with parties in postcommunist countries (4.62).
Furthermore, in Column 4, the coefficient for party
policy distance is only 20.03 (compared to 20.11 in
the postcommunist countries) and not statistically
significant. The evidence supports the existence of a
weaker relationship between party policy distance
and voter certainty in established democracies than in
postcommunist democracies.
Testing the Mechanism (II): Voter
Certainty and Vote Share
Recall that our theoretical argument also suggests
that voters are reluctant to support parties whose
positions are uncertain. Note that unlike the other
relationships that we proposed and tested, we do not
expect this relationship to differ across types of demo-
cracies; rather, we argued in the theory section that
uncertainty repels voters, in general. Accordingly, we
test this expectation by pooling all observations and
using our two measures of voter certainty about party
policy position and normalized vote share. To estimate
the models, we use OLS with robust standard errors
clustered on election.20 The results are presented in
Table 4.
We find strong support for this proposition based
on one of the measures of voter certainty: proportion
willing to place the party. In Column 1, the coefficient
for this variable is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that when respondents are more willing
to place the party on an ideological continuum, the
party is likely to gain greater vote share than parties
that citizens are less willing to place. In Column 2,
the coefficient which estimates the effect of standard
deviation of citizen placements is negative (as expected),
but it remains statistically insignificant.21 Recall that
the correlation coefficient between the two measures
of voter certainty is only 20.45. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the two measures produce somewhat
different results. One might also argue that proportion
willing to place the party is a stronger measure of
uncertainty because it is more likely to indicate that
voters truly do not know how to place the party.
The standard deviation measure, on the other hand,
captures the extent to which citizens differ in their
placements. This may not always indicate voter
uncertainty because some voters may be certain about
19The correlation coefficient is 20.45 (p , 0.01) between the
two measures of voter certainty.
20The substantive results remain unchanged if we use absolute
vote share as the dependent variable and/or robust standard
errors clustered on party.
21The substantive findings are similar when we split the sample
into advanced and postcommunist democracies and run the
analyses separately for both groups, although the result for the
postcommunist sample is statistically weaker.
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their own placement of a party even if they place it far
away from its ‘‘actual’’ position. All in all, we believe
that there is at least some empirical support for our
claim that uncertainty about party placements repels
voters.
Although we find considerable support for our
central argument and the causal mechanism, there is
a plausible alternative explanation that we have not
yet explored fully. Specifically, we found that incum-
bents (i.e., parties in government at the time of the
election) in postcommunist democracies are more
extreme than the opposition (for the former, the
average party policy distance is 2.66, for the latter, it
is only 1.69; the difference is statistically significant at
the 1% level). It is, therefore, possible that our results
are driven by incumbency and not by extremism.
There are several relationships that incumbency may
influence: (a) between policy distance and vote share
(Table 2); (b) policy distance and certainty (Table 3);
and (c) certainty and vote share (Table 4). Accord-
ingly, we include in the supplementary appendix
(Tables S5h–S4l), results for each of these relation-
ships, controlling directly for incumbency (see also
footnote 17). All substantive effects remain un-
changed in those analyses, regardless of whether
incumbency is defined by government membership
or communist successor party status.
In sum, we found that, while in advanced de-
mocracies parties benefit electorally from policy
moderation, in new democracies they benefit from
taking extreme policy positions. We further found
that voters are reluctant to support parties whose
positions they are uncertain about and that extreme
policy positioning helps increase voter certainty
about party positions in postcommunist democracies
more than in the established ones.22 Taken together,
these findings offer, in line with our theoretical
reasoning, a plausible explanation for why extreme
parties perform well in national elections in the new
democracies of postcommunist Europe: it is because
TABLE 3 Regression Coefficients for Party Policy Distance When Estimating Voter Certainty
Postcommunist Democracies Advanced Democracies
Proportion Willing
to Place Party (1)
Standard Deviation
of Placements (2)
Proportion Willing
to Place Party (3)
Standard Deviation
of Placements (4)
Party policy distance 4.62***
(1.18)
-.11**
(.05)
1.27*
(.71)
-.03
(.04)
Constant 67.16***
(3.33)
2.54***
(.11)
82.50***
(1.46)
2.08***
(.09)
N 90 90 245 245
R2 .17 .08 .02 .00
Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered on party) in parentheses. Dependent
variables are noted in column headings.
*p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
TABLE 4 The Effect of Voter Certainty on
Normalized Vote Share, All Countries
(1) Proportion
Willing
to Place Party
(2) Standard
Deviation of
Placements
Proportion willing to
place party
.56**
(.25)
Standard deviation of
placements
-2.38
(5.10)
Constant 44.17**
(22.13)
95.34***
(9.66)
N 335 335
R2 .014 .001
Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with
standard errors (clustered on election) in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable is Normalized vote share, which is calculated as the
party’s vote share multiplied by the number of competitive parties
in the election (see Equation 1 in the text).
*p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
22One might be concerned that voter certainty about party
positions is endogenous to party size. To address this, we
controlled for party size in the analyses reported in Table 3
(see Table S3n in the supplementary appendix). The effect of
party policy distance remained unchanged and the coefficient for
party size was not significant, suggesting that voter certainty
about party placement does not depend on party size. The
supplementary appendix also presents results of individual-level
analyses (see pp. S2–S7), which indicate that (a) a respondent is
more certain about the placement of a party the more extreme its
position, regardless of the party size, and (b) a respondent is
more likely to vote for a party the more certain the voters are, on
average, about the placement of that party. The results of these
additional tests alleviate concerns of endogeneity; we do ac-
knowledge, however, that given the observational data, the
endogeneity problem cannot be solved completely.
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voters are more certain about the policy stances of
these parties. Moderate parties, on the other hand,
perform poorly because voters are more likely to be
uncertain about where these parties stand on policy.
Conclusion
In this study, we have argued that (1) uncertainty about
party positions repels voters, (2) in new democracies,
extreme positioning is especially effective in reducing
voter uncertainty about party positions because, unlike
in advanced democracies, other cues about party
positions are lacking, and (3) if (1) and (2) hold, we
should observe that in new democracies, noncentrist
policy positions are electorally more beneficial than
centrist ones. In accord with this argument, we report
several remarkable findings. First, we show that in
established democracies, moderate parties gain more
votes than their extreme competitors. Second, in post-
communist countries, by contrast, we find the exact
opposite: extreme parties gain systematically more votes
than their moderate competitors. Finally, we report
a third set of findings in an attempt to explain this
remarkable difference between electoral competition
in established and postcommunist democracies.
These findings suggest that voters in all democracies
are reluctant to support parties whose positions they
are uncertain about. Furthermore, in postcommunist
democracies, citizens are more certain about the posi-
tions of extreme than moderate parties. By contrast, this
relationship is weak or nonexistent for established
democracies. This suggests that extreme parties do well
in new democracies because voters are more certain
about their left-right ideological positions than they are
of the positions of moderate parties.
We believe that the results that we report—between
party policy distance, voter certainty, and vote share—
represent a significant step forward and that they have
important implications for our understanding of the
differences in electoral competition between established
and new democracies. One of these implications is that
extreme parties perform well in transitioning democra-
cies because these parties present clear policy signals to
their electorates. While extreme party competition can
be viewed positively in the sense that parties are taking
clear stances on issues, it is simultaneously less repre-
sentative of the median voter position that is privileged
by many theorists of democracy (McDonald and Budge
2005; see also Powell 2000). Our study suggests that if
the uncertainty of the political landscape decreases in
newer democracies, the incentives for parties to present
extreme positions will decrease. Finally, while we have
identified important aggregate patterns that enhance
our understanding of party competition in established
and postcommunist countries, much more work needs
to be done at the individual level to fully explain our
results.
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